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Abstract  The  sovereign  debt  crisis  is  often  evoked  as  one  of  the  main  causes  of  the  economic
difﬁculties  faced  by  net  importing  countries  and  as  the  rationale  behind  the  austerity  mea-
sures imposed  on  their  residents.  Nothing  seems  more  evident  than  a  country  whose  global,
commercial  and  ﬁnancial,  imports  exceed  its  global  exports  has  to  ﬁnance  its  deﬁcit  through
a foreign  loan.  This  inevitably  leads  to  the  formation  of  an  external  debt.  Yet,  things  are  less
straightforward  than  they  might  appear,  and  a  rigorous  analysis  is  called  for  to  verify  whether
any country’  sovereign  debt  is  ever  justiﬁable.  The  paper  shows  that  it  is  because  net  global
imports are  paid  twice  that  net  importing  countries  run  up  a  sovereign  debt.  The  case  of  Spain  is
symptomatic  and  provides  statistical  conﬁrmation  of  the  pathological  increase  in  the  country’s
external debt.
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Resumen  La  crisis  de  la  deuda  soberana  suele  considerarse  como  una  de  las  principales  causas
de las  diﬁcultades  económicas  a  las  que  se  enfrentan  los  países  importadores  netos.  Constituye
asimismo  la  razón  que  justiﬁca  las  medidas  de  austeridad  impuestas  a  sus  residentes.  Nada
parece más  evidente  que  un  país,  cuyas  importaciones  globales,  comerciales  y  ﬁnancieras,  exce-
den sus  exportaciones  globales,  tenga  que  ﬁnanciar  su  déﬁcit  mediante  un  préstamo  extranjero.
Lo que  conduce  inevitablemente  a  la  formación  de  la  deuda  exterior.  Sin  embargo,  la  realidad
es más  compleja  de  lo  que  parece.  De  ahí  que  sea  necesario  un  análisis  riguroso  que  aclare  si
la deuda  soberana  de  cada  país  está  justiﬁcada.  Este  artículo  muestra  que  no  lo  está,  desde  el
momento  en  que  los  países  importadores  netos  se  encuentran  con  una  deuda  soberana  debido
al doble  coste  de  las  importaciones  globales  netas.  El  caso  espan˜ol  es  sintomático  y  aporta
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. Introduction
he  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  show  --  starting  from  Keynes’s
nalysis  of  what  he  called  ‘the  transfer  problem’  and  then
eferring  to  Schmitt’s  (2012,  2014,  2017)  investigation  --  that
ountries  incur  a  sovereign  debt  only  as  a  consequence  of
 pathology  affecting  the  present  system  of  international
ayments.  In  particular,  it  will  be  shown  that  it  is  because
et  imports  are  paid  twice  --  in  real  terms  and,  additionally,
n  monetary  terms  --  that  net  importing  countries  run  an
xternal  debt.  The  pathology  is  such  that  deﬁcit  countries
ave  to  make  up  for  the  difference  between  commercial  and
nancial  purchases  and  sales  even  though  their  residents
ave  fully  paid  for  their  net  imports.
To  help  understand  the  origin  and  nature  of  countries’
overeign  debts,  the  paper  considers  the  case  of  Spain  and
rovides  statistical  conﬁrmation  of  the  existence  of  a  fully
njustiﬁable  external  debt  that  has  caused  a  substantial
ncrease  in  Spain’s  unemployment.  Ofﬁcial  statistical  data
how  that  Spain’s  external  debt  has  increased  far  beyond
hat  can  be  explained  by  the  evolution  of  the  economic
variables’  accounting  for  it.
The  second  part  of  the  paper  is  devoted  to  showing  that
chmitt’s  positive  analysis  leads  to  a  normative  proposal,
.e.  to  a  reform  capable  of  dealing  with  the  pathological
ature  of  countries’  sovereign  debts.  If  implemented,  the
eform  would  enable  each  net  importing  country  to  avoid
he  formation  of  a  new  sovereign  debt  and  allow  it  to  gain
he  amount  of  national  income  paid  by  its  residents  for
heir  net  foreign  purchases.  Today,  Spain  loses  part  of  its
omestic  income  and  incurs  a  sovereign  debt.  Thanks  to  the
eform,  Spain  would  gain  the  domestic  income  correspond-
ng  to  its  net  imports,  and  would  incur  no  sovereign  debt.
his  would  be  made  possible  by  guaranteeing  the  real  pay-
ent  of  Spain’s  net  imports  through  a  transfer  to  the  rest  of
he  world  (R)  of  an  equivalent  amount  of  its  (Spain’s)  cur-
ent  output,  which  means,  without  failing  to  fully  pay  their
ue  to  the  country’s  foreign  creditors.
. From Keynes’s ‘transfer problem’
o countries’ sovereign debt
n  1929  Keynes  addressed  the  problem  posed  to  Germany
y  the  payment  of  war  reparations  at  the  end  of  the  Great
ar  and  arrived  at  the  astonishing  discovery  of  a  pathol-
gy  that  multiplied  the  cost  of  Germany’s  payment  by  two.
e  based  his  analysis  on  the  necessity  for  Germany  to  ﬁnd
oth  the  amount  of  domestic  income  covering  for  the  real
ayment  of  war  reparations,  and,  in  addition,  the  amount
f  foreign  currency  needed  to  transfer  the  payment  to  the
llies.  The  ﬁrst  requirement  was  at  the  origin  of  what  Keynes
alled  the  budgetary  problem,  while  the  second,  which  he
amed  the  transfer  problem,  was  the  cause  of  the  dupli-
ation.  In  Keynes’s  own  words,  the  budgetary  problem  was
hat  of  ‘extracting  the  necessary  sums  of  money  out  of  the
ockets  of  the  German  people’  (Keynes,  1929a:  1),  while  the
ransfer  problem  was  that  of  ‘converting  the  German  money
o  received  into  foreign  currency’  (Keynes,  1929a: 1).
The  budgetary  problem  consisted  in  the  need  for  Ger-
an  residents  to  pay  war  reparations  in  their  own  national
ncome;  the  transfer  problem  consisted  in  the  additional
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equirement  for  Germany  to  pay  war  reparations  in  a  foreign
urrency.  The  transfer  problem  arose  because  of  the  need
o  convert  the  ﬁrst  payment,  in  domestic  money,  into  a  pay-
ent  in  foreign  currencies.  The  question  asked  by  Keynes
oncerned  the  cost  of  the  conversion  and  one  can  formu-
ate  it  as  follows:  is  the  cost  of  war  reparations  in  German
omestic  currency  in  addition  to  the  one  in  foreign  curren-
ies?  That  is,  do  the  two  payments,  by  Germany  and  by
ts  residents,  add  up  to  one  another?  Keynes’s  answer  was
es,  and  he  explained  the  double  charge  affecting  Germany
y  claiming  that  the  payment  in  foreign  currencies  would
ave  entailed  the  devaluation  of  the  German  currency.  ‘For
 hold  that  the  process  of  paying  the  debt  has  the  effect
f  causing  the  money  in  which  the  debt  is  expressed  to  be
orth  a  larger  quantity  of  German-produced  goods  than  it
as  before  or  would  have  been  apart  from  the  payment  of
he  debt’  (Keynes,  1929c:  405).
Keynes’s  fellow  economists  did  not  understand  his  deep
ntuition.  In  particular  Ohlin  and  Rueff  argued  that  in  order
o  pay  for  war  reparations  Germany  had  merely  to  reduce
ts  foreign  borrowing  and  transfer  abroad  part  of  its  ‘buying
ower’.  The  ﬁnancial  outﬂows  would  have  had  the  effect
f  decreasing  ‘the  buying  power  in  Germany  and  thus  its
mportations  of  foreign  goods’  (Ohlin,  1929a:  173),  and  of
ncreasing  ‘the  buying  power  in  the  lending  countries  and,
hus,  their  importation  of  German  goods’  (Ohlin,  1929a:
73).  Yet,  the  Swedish  and  the  French  economists  failed  to
otice  that  Keynes’s  argument  was  with  the  failure  of  the
ystem  of  international  payments  to  provide  a  mechanism
llowing  for  the  cost-free  conversion  of  payments  between
onetary  sovereign  countries,  and  not  with  the  economic
ifﬁculties  faced  by  Germany.  They  did  not  understand
hat  international  payments  cannot  reduce  to  inter-regional
ayments  and  that  Keynes’s  analysis  dealt  precisely  with
he  problem  of  converting  domestic  into  international  pay-
ents.
Let  us  propose  a  formal  proof  of  Keynes’s  intuition  by
eferring  to  the  law  of  supply  and  demand  applied  to  the
urrencies  involved  in  the  payment  of  German  war  repa-
ations.  Assume  that  the  exchange  rate  between  German
ational  money,  GM,  and  the  money  of  the  rest  of  the  world,
R,  is  on  a  par:  1  GM  for  1  MR,  and  that  the  amount  to  be
aid  in  war  reparations  amounts  to  x  MR  (=  x  GM).  The  condi-
ion  for  Germany  to  be  able  to  honour  its  external  debt  is
o  earn  x  units  of  MR.  As  Ohlin  (1929a,  1929b)  and  Rueff
1929), Keynes  (1929a,  1929b,  1929c)  agreed  with  the  need
or  Germany  to  increase  its  net  exports  in  order  to  obtain
he  amount  of  MR  required  to  pay  for  its  war  reparations.
et  us  therefore  suppose  German  net  exports  to  be  equal  to
 MR,  and  analyse  what  happens  to  the  German  currency’s
xchange  rate  when  the  rest  of  the  world  pays  Germany  for
ts  net  foreign  sales  and,  then,  when  Germany  pays  the  Allies
heir  due,  Fig.  1.
The  payment  of  German  net  exports  by  the  rest  of  the
orld  deﬁnes  a  demand  of  German  currency  in  terms  of
R.  On  the  other  hand,  the  payment  of  war  reparations
which  forces  German  residents  to  pay  an  amount  of  x  GM
n  taxes)  deﬁnes  a  demand  of  MR  in  terms  of  GM.  Appar-
ntly,  the  two  opposite  demands  balance  each  other  and
hould  have  no  effect  on  German  national  currency.  Yet,  this
eans  to  forget  that  the  law  of  supply  and  demand  exerts
ts  effect  according  to  the  elasticity  of  supply:  the  lesser  the
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sFigure  1  The  payment  of  German  war  reparations.
elasticity  of  supply,  the  lesser  the  effect  of  a  sudden  increase
in  demand  on  prices  and  vice  versa.  The  apposite  question
concerns  therefore  the  degree  of  elasticity  of  the  supply  of
German  money  when  German  banks  are  credited  in  MR  and
pay  German  exporters  in  GM.
As  bankers  would  conﬁrm,  German  banks  pay  their  fellow
exporters  simply  by  entering  a  sum  of  GM  on  the  liabilities
side  of  their  balance  sheet,  an  entry  that  matches  the  one,
of  x  MR,  on  the  assets  side.  Known  as  the  monetization  of
foreign  currencies,  this  operation,  which  the  German  central
bank  takes  over,  deﬁnes  an  emission  of  GM  and  is  costless
for  the  German  banking  system.  Hence,  it  is  compulsory  to
infer  that,  with  respect  to  the  demand  exerted  in  MR  by
the  rest  of  world,  the  supply  of  GM  is  perfectly  elastic:
whatever  the  amount  of  GM  required  to  monetize  the  MR
obtained  as  payment  of  its  net  exports,  Germany’s  banking
system  can  instantly  create  it  at  zero  cost.  The  implication
for  the  exchange  rate  of  the  German  currency  is  clear:  GM’s
exchange  rate  with  respect  to  MR  remains  unaltered.
However,  things  are  radically  different  as  far  as  the  pay-
ment  of  war  reparations  by  the  German  nation  is  concerned.
Since  German  banks  cannot  create  the  slightest  sum  of  MR,
for  Germany  the  elasticity  of  the  supply  of  foreign  currencies
is  zero.  In  no  circumstance  does  the  supply  of  MR  automat-
ically  adjust  to  the  demand  exerted  by  GM.  The  German
banking  system  has  to  ﬁnd  on  the  foreign  exchange  market
the  sum  of  MR  needed  to  convert  its  payment  to  the  Allies.
It  is  true  that  the  rest  of  the  world  credits  the  German  cen-
tral  bank  with  a  sum  of  MR  following  the  payment,  by  R,  of
German  net  exports.  Yet,  it  would  be  mistaken  to  believe
that  this  means  that  Germany  can  use  it  for  the  payment  of
its  war  reparations  without  having  to  purchase  it.  Indeed,
ofﬁcial  reserves  are  immediately  invested  on  the  interna-
tional  market  and  in  no  case  are  they  made  available  free
of  cost  to  the  German  government.  This  clearly  means  that
the  conversion  of  the  payment  made  by  German  residents  in
GM  (to  Germany’s  Budget)  into  a  payment  in  MR  deﬁnes  a net
demand  of  MR  in  terms  of  GM,  which  an  equivalent  increase
in  supply  cannot  match.  Because  of  the  inelasticity  of  MR’s
supply,  the  increase  in  demand  exerted  by  Germany  in  its
national  currency  leads  to  its  devaluation  with  respect  to
MR,  which  supports  Keynes’s  claim  about  the  additional  cost
of  the  payment  of  war  reparations  caused  by  the  transfer
problem.
Keynes  was  not  able  to  convince  his  fellow  economists,
and  his  intuition  remained  somehow  mysterious.  Indeed,
if  devaluation  was  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  pay-
ment  of  a  country’s  net  foreign  purchases  of  commercial
and  ﬁnancial  goods  (of  which  the  payment  of  war  repara-
tions  is  only  a  particular  case),  a  great  number  of  countries
i
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hould  actually  suffer  from  a  constant  and  massive  devalua-
ion  of  their  national  currencies,  which  is  not  the  case.  What
eynes  did  not  investigate  was  the  possibility  for  the  neu-
ralization  of  the  devaluating  pressure  by  means  of  a  foreign
oan.  Instead  of  purchasing  on  the  foreign  exchange  mar-
et  the  foreign  currency  needed  to  pay  for  its  net  imports
commercial  and  ﬁnancial),  the  deﬁcit  country  can  ﬁnance
hem  by  borrowing  abroad  the  required  sum  of  MR.  Yet,  it
s  hardly  necessary  to  note  that,  while  it  avoids  the  deval-
ation  of  the  deﬁcit  country’s  national  currency,  the  resort
o  a  foreign  loan  does  not  avoid  the  implications  of  Keynes’s
ransfer  problem.  It  is  indeed  clear  that  the  deﬁcit  coun-
ry  can  avoid  the  devaluation  of  its  domestic  currency  only
t  the  cost  of  incurring  an  external  debt.  This  shows  that
eynes’s  diagnosis  of  the  transfer  problem  is  but  a  ﬁrst,
mportant  step  towards  that  of  an  increasingly  worrisome
isorder:  that  of  the  external  debt  crisis.  Let  us  dwell  on
his  by  following  Schmitt’s  ground-breaking  discovery  of  the
athological  nature  of  countries’  sovereign  debts  (Schmitt,
012,  2014,  2017).
.  The pathological formation of sovereign
ebts
 privileged  starting  point  is  the  balance-of-payments  iden-
ity  between  global  imports  and  global  exports:
M  =  EX
here  IM  represents  the  sum  total  of  a  country’s  imports  or
urchases  of  commercial  and  ﬁnancial  assets,  and  EX  stands
or  its  total  exports  or  sales  of  commercial  and  ﬁnancial
ssets.
The  founding  principle  of  the  balance-of-payment  iden-
ity  is  that  of  double-entry  bookkeeping.  As  claimed  by  Stern
1973:  2), in  the  balance-of-payments  ‘[t]ransactions  are
ecorded  in  principle  on  a  double-entry  bookkeeping  basis.
ach  transaction  entered  in  the  accounts  as  a credit  must
ave  a  corresponding  debit  and  vice  versa.  [.  . .] It  follows
rom  double-entry  bookkeeping  that  the  balance  of  pay-
ents  must  always  balance:  total  debits  equal  total  credits’.
et  us  refer  to  the  fact  that  --  as  Stern  (1973)  explicitly
aintained,  and  Krugman  and  Obstfeld  (2003:  314)  among
thers  successively  reiterated  --  each  transaction  must  be
ecorded  as  a  credit  and  a  debit.  We  immediately  see  that
he  required  equality  between  total  purchases  and  total
ales  is  but  a  consequence  of  double-entry  bookkeeping
s  applied  to  each  transaction  entering  the  balance-of-
ayments.  In  the  IMF’s  ofﬁcial  publications  (International
onetary  Fund,  2009),  the  IM  =  EX  identity  is  introduced
n  the  form  of  CA  +  KFA  =  0,  where  CA  stands  for  ‘current
ccount’  and  KFA  for  ‘capital  and  ﬁnancial  account’,  which
mphasizes  the  need  for  net  current  account  transactions
o  be  matched  by  net  capital  and  ﬁnancial  account  transac-
ions.  Both  forms  are  correct,  and  our  choice  of  the  former
s  justiﬁed  by  the  desire  to  found  the  analysis  of  countries’
overeign  debt  on  the  clearest  and  simplest  concepts  regard-
ng  international  transactions  and  their  relationship.
What  we  want  to  stress  here  is  that  the  relationship
M  =  EX  is  central  to  international  economics  and  deﬁnes
 logical  law  countries  have  necessarily  to  comply  with.
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t  states  that  each  country’s  foreign  global  purchases  are
lways  and  necessarily  equal  to  its  foreign  global  sales  or,  in
chmitt’s  words,  that  countries  too  are  subject  to  the  law
f  the  identity  between  each  economic  agent’s  sales  and
urchases  (see  Schmitt,  1975).
Let  us  consider  the  case  of  a  country  suffering  from
 positive  sovereign  debt.  According  to  the  majority  of
conomists  and  experts  of  international  economics,  such  a
ituation  arises  when  a  country’s  expenditures  exceed  its
ales,  so  that  it  has  to  incur  a  debt  to  ﬁnance  its  net  imports
hrough  a  foreign  loan.  Let  us  make  it  clear  from  the  outset:
he  problem  is  macroeconomic  and  concerns  the  country  as
 whole,  as  the  set  of  its  residents.  Hence,  the  expression
sovereign  debt’  stands  for  the  external  debt  carried  by  the
ountry  itself  following  the  external  sales  and  purchases,
ommercial  and  ﬁnancial,  of  both  its  public  and  private
ectors.  A  very  simple  numerical  example  will  prove  use-
ul.  Consider  a  country,  A,  whose  global  imports  are  equal
o  11  MR  (for  example,  billions  of  US  dollars),  and  whose
lobal  exports  are  of  10  MR,  where  MR  stands  for  money  of
ountry  R,  the  rest  of  the  world.  In  order  to  ﬁnance  its  net
mports  of  1  MR,  country  A  has  to  obtain  a  foreign  loan  of
hat  amount  from  R.  It  seems  therefore  obvious  to  infer  that
ountry  A  incurs  an  external  debt,  and  that  its  residents  will
ave  eventually  to  accept  the  austerity  measures  required  to
onour  it.  Apparently,  respect  of  the  balance-of-payments
dentity  entails  the  formation  of  A’s  sovereign  debt,  which
eads  to  the  unavoidable  conclusion  that  country  A  has  lived
eyond  its  means.
This  is  however  to  forget  that,  by  imposing  the  equality
etween  A’s  total  imports  and  its  total  exports,  the  balance-
f-payments  identity  is  inconsistent  and  at  odds  with  the
ormation  of  an  external  debt  of  the  country  itself.  In  other
ords,  once  the  identity  is  established,  A’s  net  imports  are
ully  paid  through  equivalent  exports,  and  no  justiﬁcation
an  be  found  for  the  existence  of  a  positive  sovereign  debt.
et  us  analyse  further  our  numerical  example  and  verify
hat  happens  when  A  obtains  a  foreign  loan  from  R.
According  to  the  initial  situation,  R’s  imports  of  A’s  cur-
ent  output  are  only  equal  to  10  MR,  while  its  (R’s)  exports
f  domestic  current  output  are  equal  to  11  MR.  The  loan
btained  from  R  has  the  effect  of  reducing  to  zero  the  dif-
erence,  of  1  MR,  between  R’s  total  exports  and  its  total
mports.  This  is  so,  because  the  object  of  R’s  loan  to  A  is
 part,  of  value  1  MR,  of  A’s  future  output.  Indeed,  A  will
eimburse  the  loan,  in  a  successive  period,  by  giving  up  an
qual  amount  of  foreign  currency  earned  through  its  exports
f  real  goods.  Since  the  period  in  which  R’s  loan  is  granted  to
,  country  R  acquires  the  ownership  over  part  of  A’s  future
roduction,  and  brings  its  total  imports  to  the  level  of  its
otal  exports,  11  MR.
Country  R
Imports  of  A’s  current  production  =  10  MR
Imports  of  A’s  future  production  =  1  MR
Total  imports11 MRWe  claim  that,  having  paid  the  totality  of  its  imports
n  real  terms  through  an  export  of  its  current  production
nd  one  of  its  future  output,  country  A  should  not  incur  any
xternal  debt  to  R.
b
R
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As  a  matter  of  fact,  as  implied  by  Keynes’s  intuition
oncerning  the  duplication  of  the  cost  of  war  reparations,
ountry  A’s  sovereign  debt  is  the  pathological  result  of  a
uplication  due  to  the  absence  of  a  true  system  of  inter-
ational  payments.  Analogously  with  Keynes’s  argument,
ountry  A’s  net  imports  are  paid  by  A’s  residents  and  addi-
ionally  by  their  country.  This  is  so  because,  in  the  present
on-system  of  international  payments,  the  transfer  to  R  of
he  real  payment  of  A’s  net  imports  carried  out  by  its  resi-
ents  can  only  take  place  at  a  cost:  the  monetary  payment
dds  up  to  the  real  payment  and  forces  country  A  to  incur  an
xternal  debt  totally  unjustiﬁed  and  unjustiﬁable.  Indeed,
chmitt  (2014)  proves  that  presently  two  foreign  loans  are
equired  for  the  payment  of  A’s  net  imports.  One  loan  makes
p  for  the  real  payment,  whereas  a  second  loan  is  necessary
o  carry  out  the  monetary  payment.  What  has  gone  unno-
iced  so  far  is  that  a  single  loan  cannot  have  as  its  object
oth  a  sum  of  real  goods  and  a  sum  of  foreign  currency.
Two  equalities  are  crucial  here:
)  The  sum  of  real  values  exported  (commercial  and  ﬁnan-
cial)  must  be  equal  to  the  sum  of  real  values  imported
(also  commercial  and  ﬁnancial);
)  The  sum  of  monetary  payments  must  be  the  same  for  A
and  R.
Equality  (1)  is  obtained  through  the  export  of  a  sum  of
’s  future  products;  it  results  from  the  ﬁrst  loan  of  1  MR
ranted  to  A  by  the  rest  of  the  world.  Equality  (2)  calls
or  a  new  loan  of  1 MR,  which  gives  rise  to  A’s  sovereign
ebt.  The  ﬁrst  loan,  designed  by  Schmitt  (2014)  as  an  ‘ordi-
ary’  loan,  ﬁnances  A’s  future  exports  of  real  goods,  and
hus  brings  R’s  imports  to  the  level  of  its  exports.  The  sec-
nd  loan  is  macroeconomic,  and  provides  country  A  with  the
mount  of  foreign  currency  (MR)  it  needs  to  make  up  for
he  difference  between  its  expenditures  and  its  receipts.
n  order  to  ﬁnance  both  its  future  exports  of  real  goods
nd  its  actual  net  imports,  country  A  has  to  borrow  abroad.
Now,  it  is  obviously  inconceivable  that  the  same  loan  of
 MR  pays  for,  at  the  same  time  and  for  the  same  period,  an
xport  of  1  MR  and  an  import  of  1  MR  of  the  same  economy’
Schmitt,  2014: 22).  Two  loans  of  1  MR  each  are  required,
f  which  only  one  is  justiﬁed.  The  second  loan  is  the  conse-
uence  of  the  pathological  system  of  international  payments
dopted  so  far,  which  does  not  provide  countries  with  the
nternational  means  of  payment  necessary  to  convey  the
ayment,  in  real  terms,  of  their  net  global  imports.  The
rst  loan  is  an  ordinary  one  and,  as  such,  is  included  in  A’s
alance-of-payments.  It  is  perfectly  in  line  with  the  balance-
f-payments  identity  and  is  thus  perfectly  justiﬁed.  In  other
ords,  the  ordinary  loan  speciﬁes  a  debt  incurred  by  A’s
esidents  that  does  not  in  the  least  entail  a  positive,  macroe-
onomic  indebtedness  of  their  country.  On  the  contrary,  the
econd  loan  is  of  a  macroeconomic  nature  and,  although
ncurred  by  country  A’s  residents,  deﬁnes  a  debt  that  rests
n  the  country  as  a  whole:  a  sovereign  debt.  ‘Sovereign  debt
s  thus  ﬁnally  acknowledged  in  its  precise  nature:  it  is  car-
ied  in  addition  to  the  debt  that  is  naturally  included  in  the
alance  of  payments’  (Schmitt,  2014: 29).
When  country  A’s  residents  borrow  1  MR,  they  obtain  from
 the  ﬁnancing  of  an  equivalent  part  of  their  future  output:
he  loan  will  be  reimbursed  in  a  successive  period  through
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a  real  export  of  A’s  economy.  This  means  that  lenders  of  R
become  the  owners  of  part  of  A’s  future  production  from
the  moment  the  loan  is  granted  to  A.  In  other  words,  econ-
omy  A  gives  up  immediately  the  ownership  over  part  of  its
national  output  to  be  produced  in  the  future,  which  is  tanta-
mount  to  saying  that,  through  its  loan,  R  ﬁnances  part  of  A’s
future  production.  This  is  nothing  other  than  the  real  pay-
ment  of  A’s  net  imports.  Yet,  A’s  net  purchases  are  still  to
be  paid  monetarily, because  R’s  exporters  have  to  be  paid
in  MR.  Given  that  the  object  of  the  ﬁrst  loan  obtained  by
A’s  economy  is  part  of  its  future  product  and  not  a  sum  of
MR,  a  second  loan  of  the  same  value  is  necessary  for  A  to
pay  its  net  imports.  It  is  this  second  loan  that  gives  rise  to
A’s  sovereign  debt.  Finally,  two  loans  of  1  MR  value  each  are
required  to  settle  A’s  net  foreign  purchases  whose  value  is
merely  equal  to  1  MR.  The  second  loan  is  totally  unjustiﬁed
and  is  the  mark  of  the  duplication  arising  today  any  time  a
country  ﬁnances  its  net  imports  through  a  foreign  loan.
Let  us  shortly  go  back  to  the  balance-of-payments  iden-
tity.  Today,  it  is  thanks  to  R’s  ﬁrst  loan  that  the  identity
is  complied  with.  Through  this  loan,  R’s  total  imports  are
increased  from  10  MR  to  11  MR,  because  its  effect  is  to  give  R
the  ownership  over  part  of  A’s  future  production.  This  brings
A’s  exports  to  the  level  of  its  imports,  and  deﬁnes  the  real
payment  (or  the  payment  in  real  goods)  of  its  initial  net
imports.  At  this  point,  the  reader  could  remark  that  A  has
not  yet  reimbursed  the  loan  obtained  from  R,  which  would
justify  the  existence  of  a  net  debt  of  A  to  R.  This  argument
is  not  correct,  because  it  misses  the  fact  that  the  amount
of  foreign  currency,  equal  to  1  MR,  lent  by  R  is  still  avail-
able  in  A.  In  particular,  the  amount  obtained  from  R  could
be  used  to  increase  A’s  ofﬁcial  and/or  private  reserves,  in
which  case  A’s  debt  to  R  would  be  balanced  by  the  credit
of  A’s  reserves  towards  the  rest  of  the  world.  Having  fully
paid  in  real  terms  its  net  imports,  A  should  indeed  beneﬁt
from  a  positive  inﬂow,  of  1  MR,  which  would  match  its  exter-
nal  debt.  It  follows  that,  in  itself,  the  balance-of-payments
identity  is  never  the  cause  of  any  positive  sovereign  debt.
If  things  go  wrong  and  countries  incur  sovereign  debts  it  is
because  the  present  system  of  international  payments  is  not
in  line  with  this  identity:  it  forces  indebted  countries  like  A
to  use  the  foreign  currencies  obtained  from  R  to  pay  addi-
tionally  for  their  net  imports.  A’s  sovereign  debt  is  precisely
the  result  of  the  loss  of  the  foreign  currency  that  should
have  increased  its  ofﬁcial  and  private  reserves.
The  necessity  of  two  foreign  loans  of  1  MR  value  each
results  very  clearly  from  the  fact  that  A  must  at  the  same
time  reimburse  the  lenders  of  R  and  pay  R’s  exporters.  Since
A  will  give  up  to  R  part  of  its  future  output,  the  foreign
currencies  obtained  as  a  loan  should  be  added  to  its  inter-
national  reserves  of  period  p0.  This  not  being  the  case,  A
loses  both  part  of  its  future  production  and  an  equal  part  of
its  current  output.  The  ﬁrst  loss  is  due  to  the  reimbursement
of  the  loan  obtained  from  R,  the  second  loss  is  due  to  the
foreign  debt  that  A  incurs  since  period  p0.
A  distinction  between  periods  helps  to  understand  the
problem.  Let  us  suppose  that  economy  A  reimburses  the  loan
obtained  in  the  ﬁrst  period,  p0,  in  the  following  period,  p1,
and  that  A’s  net  imports  in  p1 are  equal  to  the  ones  in  p0. In
order  to  reimburse  R  in  period  p1 A  must  give  up  part  of  the
foreign  currencies  it  earns  through  its  exports.  This  means
that,  once  it  has  reimbursed  R,  A  has  at  its  disposal  the  sum
i
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f  10  MR  −  1  MR  =  9  MR.  However,  A’s  total  purchases  in  p1 are
f  11  MR,  the  difference  between  A’s  total  expenditures  and
ts  net  entries  in  foreign  currency  are  therefore  equal  to
 MR,  twice  the  amount  of  its  net  imports.
Another  proof  of  the  pathological  nature  of  countries’
overeign  debts  proposed  by  Schmitt  (2014)  is  based  on  the
ndisputable  fact  that  residents  of  any  deﬁcit  country,  A,
ay  for  the  totality  of  their  foreign  purchases.  Let  us  con-
ider  the  case  of  Greece.  Everybody  seems  to  agree  that  the
uge  amount  of  Greece’s  sovereign  debt  is  the  unavoidable
esult  of  it  having  lived  beyond  its  possibilities  and  having
eneﬁted  from  free  lunches  at  the  expense  of  the  rest  of
he  world  in  general,  of  Germany  and  other  European  coun-
ries  in  particular.  Now,  this  would  indeed  be  true  only  if
reece  had  never  paid  for  its  net  imports,  which  is  not  the
ase.  In  reality,  Greek  residents  have  paid  the  totality  of
heir  imports,  net  imports  included,  in  their  own  national
oney.  Since  Greek  residents  have  lost  part  of  their  national
ncome  to  cover  for  the  real  payment  of  their  foreign  pur-
hases,  there  is  no  logical  justiﬁcation  for  the  formation  of
he  external  debt  of  their  own  country.  In  the  same  way  as
ermany  should  not  have  run  an  external  debt  on  top  of  its
ational  product  lost  in  war  reparations,  Greece  should  not
arry  the  burden  of  a  sovereign  debt  that  adds  up  to  the  loss
f  national  income  suffered  by  its  domestic  economy.
Given  the  complexity  of  the  argument  and  its  relevance
or  the  future  of  indebted  countries,  let  us  discuss  further
he  double  payment  of  net  imports.  What  must  be  made
lear  from  the  outset  is  that  the  pathology  denounced  by
chmitt  (2012,  2014), Cencini  (2016,  2017), and  Cencini
nd  Rossi  (2015)  characterizes  the  present  non-system  of
nternational  payments  and  occurs  any  time  a  net  importing
ountry  pays  for  its  net  foreign  purchases  through  a  foreign
oan.  A  ﬁrst  and  superﬁcial  analysis  seems  to  corroborate  the
ide-held  belief  that  the  external  debt  incurred  by  deﬁcit
ountries  is  perfectly  justiﬁed,  because  of  the  foreign  loans
equired  to  ﬁnance  their  net  imports  of  commercial  and
nancial  goods.  However,  at  closer  examination  it  appears
hat  countries’  residents  pay  for  the  entirety  of  their  inter-
ational  transactions.  Only  two  possibilities  are  therefore
onceivable:  either
)  The  domestic  income  spent  by  a net  importing  country’s
residents  is  earned  by  the  country  itself,  or
)  The  domestic  income  paying  for  the  residents’  net
imports  is  lost  to  the  country  as  a  whole.
As  everyone  can  immediately  verify,  the  net  importing
ountry  (its  central  bank,  government,  or  Treasury)  is  not
redited  with  the  domestic  income  spent  by  its  residents.  If
t  were,  it  could  be  maintained  that  the  country’s  external
ndebtedness  derived  from  the  foreign  loan  that  ﬁnances  its
et  imports  is  balanced  by  a  net  inﬂow  of  domestic  income.
his  not  being  the  case,  it  is  compulsory  to  infer  that  net
mporting  countries  suffer  at  the  same  time  from  a  loss  of
ational  income  and  an  increase  in  their  external  debt.
The  previous  conclusion  might  sound  weird  and  a  crit-
cal  reader  could  point  out  that,  if  it  were  true  that  net
mporting  countries  lose  part  of  their  national  income  every
ime  their  residents  pay  for  their  net  imports  (commer-
ial  and  ﬁnancial),  deﬂation  would  have  severely  hampered
heir  economies.  The  presence  of  deﬂation  would  be  there
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o  conﬁrm  the  existence  of  the  double  payment  we  are  so
ainstakingly  trying  to  prove.  The  fact  that  deﬁcit  countries
o  not  suffer  from  such  a  decrease  in  their  current  national
ncome  is  therefore  the  clear  proof  that  these  countries  do
ot  have  to  pay  twice  for  their  net  imports,  and  that  their
overeign  debt  is  entirely  justiﬁed.  Or  is  it?  What  is  miss-
ng  in  this  argument  is  an  explanation  of  the  way  countries’
omestic  economies  recover  the  amount  of  national  income
ost  by  their  residents  in  the  payment  of  their  net  imports.
ndeed,  it  is  beyond  dispute  that  countries  do  not  earn  the
mount  paid  by  their  residents.  If,  lost  through  the  payment
f  A’s  net  imports,  the  amount  of  domestic  income  spent  by
he  country’s  residents  in  the  payment  of  their  net  imports
s  still  available  in  A,  it  is  because  A  has  somehow  recov-
red  it.  Now,  what  allows  for  the  recovery  of  A’s  domestic
ncome  is  the  ﬁrst  loan  obtained  by  A’s  economy  from  the
est  of  the  world.  To  say  that  A  can  ﬁnance  part  of  its  future
roduction  through  this  loan  or  that  it  is  able  to  recover  the
mount  of  domestic  income  lost  in  the  payment  of  its  resi-
ents’  net  imports  is  not  substantially  different.  In  any  case,
he  object  of  the  ﬁrst  loan  obtained  from  R  is  not  an  amount
f  MR,  but  rather  an  amount  of  MA  that,  by  restoring  the  pre-
ious  level  of  A’s  domestic  income,  allows  for  the  ﬁnancing
f  its  future  production.  Whatever  explanation  we  choose
ventually,  it  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  another  loan  is
equired  in  order  for  A  to  be  able  to  pay,  in  money  terms,
ts  net  imports.  Country  A  must  carry  out  the  payment  of  R’s
xporters  in  MR,  which  makes  it  compulsory  for  A  to  incur
nother  debt  in  order  to  obtain  the  required  amount  of  MR.
As  previously  observed,  the  reason  of  the  pathological
ormation  of  sovereign  debts  lies  in  the  lack  of  a  true  sys-
em  of  international  payments  allowing  for  the  automatic
nd  cost-free  transfer  of  the  payments  carried  out  by  the
esidents  of  different  countries.  Such  a  system  exists  within
ny  given  country,  so  that  the  monetary  payment  is  never
dded  on  top  of  the  real  payment.  For  example,  if  an  eco-
omic  agent  a  needs  to  pay  an  economic  agent  b,  s/he  has
erely  to  ﬁnd  the  income  required,  without  having  to  worry
bout  the  money  necessary  to  convey  her/his  real  payment.
anks  provide  the  necessary  vehicular  money  at  no  cost,  and
he  structure  of  the  banking  system  is  such  that  it  guarantees
he  vehicular  use  of  bank  money.  This  is  unfortunately  not
he  case  at  the  international  level.  Deﬁcit  countries  must
ay  for  the  purchase  of  a  means  of  payment  (money)  that
 system  of  international  payments  should  provide  free  of
ost.  The  real  payment  of  net  imports  is  perfectly  justiﬁed,
o  one  denies  it,  but  it  is  highly  unjust  that,  on  top  of  losing
art  of  its  national  product,  a  country  has  to  get  indebted
n  order  to  obtain  a  mere  numerical  means  of  payment.
. A statistical conﬁrmation: the case of Spain
t  is  no  mystery  that  Spain  is  a  heavily  indebted  country.
ts  gross  external  debt  has  constantly  been  raising  and  its
ebtor  position  (TARGET2  balances)  with  regard  to  the  Euro-
ean  Central  Bank  (ECB)  reached  266’5  billion  euros  at  the
eginning  of  2016  (ECB,  2016).  Before  analysing  the  situ-
tion  of  Spain  starting  from  the  ofﬁcial  data  published  by
he  World  Bank  and  the  IMF,  a  few  words  are  necessary  to  do
way  with  an  apparent  contradiction  between  our  claim  that
et  importing  countries,  Spain  included,  pay  twice  their  net
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mports,  ﬁrst  in  domestic  income  and,  additionally,  in  MR,
nd  the  fact  that  Spain  is  a  member  of  the  euro-zone  and
o  pays  in  euros  for  its  net  purchases  from  other  member
ountries.
It is  clear  that  if  the  euro  were  indeed  a  single  currency,
ayments  among  euro-zone  member  countries  would  be  of
he  same  nature  as  the  payments  carried  out  by  residents
f  different  regions  of  the  same  country.  ‘[I]t  follows  from
he  logic  of  the  single  currency  that  all  Euro-denominated
ayment  and  securities  transactions  within  the  Euro  zone
i.e.  within  the  borders  of  the  currency  area)  are  ‘domes-
ic’’  (Kokkola,  2010:  174).  If  this  were  the  case,  no  sovereign
ebt  between  euro-zone  member  countries  could  ever  arise,
ecause  their  residents  would  carry  out  all  their  payments
sing  the  same  unit  of  account  and  the  same  system  of  ﬁnal
ettlements.  Two  observations  lead,  however,  to  a  differ-
nt  and  rather  distressing  conclusion.  Both  are  factual  and
onceptual  at  the  same  time.
The  ﬁrst  concerns  the  lack  of  a  centralized  system  of
ayments  whereby  the  ECB  would  ‘vehiculate’  or  convey
ach  payment  between  residents  of  different  euro-member
ountries  through  the  circular  emission  of  a common  cur-
ency  (see  Cencini,  2010,  2016).  As  it  happens  within  any
ational  banking  system,  payments  between  clients  of  dif-
erent  banks  require  the  intervention  of  the  central  bank
cting  as  monetary  and  ﬁnancial  intermediary.  This  implies
oth  the  emission  of  central  bank  money  and  the  implemen-
ation  of  a  real-time  gross  settlement  mechanism  founded
n  a  system  of  multilateral  clearing.  Each  payment  has
o  go  through  a process  that  gives  banks’  currencies  a
ommon  form  and  allows  for  the  settlement  of  interbank
ransactions  in  real  terms.  As  clearly  stated  in  the  Blue
ook  published  in  2007  by  the  ECB, in  both  the  ﬁrst  and
econd  version  of  TARGET  (Trans-European  automated  Real-
ime  Gross-settlement  Express  Transfer  system)  payments
etween  residents  of  euro-zone  member  countries  are  car-
ied  out  without  the  active  intervention  of  the  ECB.  Because
f  the  lack  of  a  common  form  provided  by  a  process  of
atalysis  managed  by  the  ECB,  national  currencies  of  euro-
ember  countries  are  doomed  to  remain  heterogeneous:
espite  appearances  to  the  contrary,  the  euro  is  not  yet  the
ingle  currency  people  assume  it  is.
The  second  observation  relates  to  the  existence  of  huge
mounts  of  debts  incurred  by  euro-member  countries  and
ntered  by  the  ECB  as  TARGET2  balances  (Rossi,  2012).  Thus,
or  example,  in  October  2016  Spain  was  running  a  deﬁcit  of
13’8  billion  euros,  while  Germany  had  a  credit  of  708  billion
uros  (ECB,  2016).  According  to  Sinn  and  Wollmershäuser
2012:  488),  target  balances  are  indeed  symptomatic  of
he  existence  of  debts  between  euro-member  countries:  ‘a
ountry’s  target  debt  measures  the  accumulated  balance-
f-payments  deﬁcit  with  other  Euro  countries’.  This  would
ot  be  so,  and  ECB’s  experts  would  be  right  to  claim  that
TARGET2  balances  of  Euro  zone  NCBs  [national  central
anks]  reﬂect  the  uneven  distribution  of  central  bank  liq-
idity  within  the  Eurosystem’  (ECB,  2011:  39),  only  if  the
uro  were  proven  to  be  the  single  currency  of  the  euro-
one.  Unfortunately,  as  conﬁrmed  by  the  absence  of  a
rue  RTGS  (real-time  gross  settlement)  system,  and  by  the
xistence  of  important  differences  in  euro-member  coun-
ries’  spreads,  this  is  precisely  what  the  Eurosystem  is  still
acking.
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Table  1  Statistical  data  concerning  Spain’s  external  debt  between  2003  and  2015  (in  millions  of  US  dollars).
Year  Current  account
balance
Gross  external
debt  position
Total  reserves  (gold
included)
Net  international
investment  position
2002  708,462  40,303  −350,958
2003 −35,091  980,238  26,809  −489,147
2004 −59,780  1,235,786  19,759  −652,973
2005 −87,006 1,350,532  17,227  −646,880
2006 −113,750 1,805,104  19,340  −900,868
2007 −143,137 2,302,440  19,029  −1,265,837
2008 −152,546 2,327,412  20,288  −1,246,523
2009 −63,718  2,536,103  28,051  −1,453,891
2010 −56,363  2,296,296  31,872  −1,279,204
2011 −47,060  2,261,505  46,705  −1,273,385
2012 −3420  1,727,903  50,588  −1,233,558
2013 20,756  2,260,893  46,335  −1,334,533
2014 14,148  2,111,282  50,412  −1,227,344
2015 16,208  1,972,936  53,974  −1,053,226
CA deﬁcits  (
∑
)
761,871
()
1,264,474
()
13,671
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Source:  World Bank (2016a, 2016b) and IMF (2016a, 2016b).
Hence,  Spain’s  residents  carry  out  their  international
payments  in  Spanish  euros, Italian  residents  carry  them  out
in  Italian  euros, Greek  residents  in  Greek  euros, and  so  on.  It
follows,  that  the  general  analysis  introduced  in  the  ﬁrst  part
of  this  paper  holds  good  for  Spain  not  only  with  respect  to  its
extra-European  payments,  but  also  for  its  external  payments
within  the  euro-zone.
In  order  to  carry  out  the  statistical  veriﬁcation  or  refu-
tation  of  any  theoretical  thesis  one  has  ﬁrst  to  establish  the
relevant  statistical  data  and  their  reliability.  In  our  case,
the  relevant  data  concern  the  amount  of  Spain’s  external
debt  and  of  all  those  balance-of-payments  entries  that  can
justify  it.  As  for  Spain’s  debt,  the  best  ofﬁcial  data  at  our
disposal  are  those  of  the  gross  external  debt  position  and
these  can  be  found  in  The  World  Bank  Open  Data  collection
of  time  series  data  of  the  World  Bank.  In  Table  1  the  reader
can  ﬁnd  the  yearly  data  concerning  Spain’s  gross  external
debt  position  from  2002  to  2015.  The  difference  between
the  amount  reached  in  2015  and  that  of  2002  (end  of  the
year),  shows  the  increase  in  debt  Spain  had  to  endure  in  the
period  under  exam.
As  for  the  data  liable  to  justify  this  increase,  the  most
signiﬁcant  are  those  of  Spain’s  current  account  (CA)  deﬁcit.
The  ones  entered  into  Table  1  are  those  collected  by  the
IMF  and  show  a  persistent  deﬁcit  throughout  the  period
2003--2012  and  a  surplus  for  the  following  three  years.  The
sum  of  Spain’s  net  current  account  deﬁcits  from  2003  and
2015  explains  part  of  the  increase  in  its  external  debt  during
the  same  period.
Another  pertinent  data  set  concerns  the  variation  in
Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves.  Since  central  banks  lend  the  foreign
currencies  entered  in  the  reserve  account  without  delay,
an  increase  in  this  major  component  of  countries’  ofﬁcial
reserves  deﬁnes  an  increase  in  their  credits  towards  the  rest
of  the  world.  Yet,  as  the  data  of  Spain’s  external  debt  are
those  of  its  gross  external  debt  position  and  given  the  neg-
ative  sign  of  Spain’s  current  account,  it  is  clear  that  the
a
i
2
dncrease  in  its  ofﬁcial  reserves  gives  necessarily  rise  to  an
qual  increase  in  its  gross  external  debt.  The  same  is  true  for
he  other  components  of  Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves.  Gold,
or  example,  is  an  asset  that  the  Spanish  central  bank  can
btain  only  by  purchasing  it,  a  transaction  that  requires  the
xpenditure  of  an  equivalent  amount  of  foreign  currencies.
inally,  the  positive  variation  in  Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves,
iven  by  the  difference  between  their  amount  in  2015  and
n  2002  (end  of  the  year),  has  to  be  included  in  the  data
ccounting  for  the  increase  in  Spain’s  gross  external  debt
osition  in  the  period  2003--2015.
The  last  data  relevant  in  our  case  are  those  of  the
et  International  Investment  Position  (IIP)  as  collected  and
laborated  by  the  IMF.  In  particular,  what  we  have  to  ver-
fy  is  whether  from  2003  to  2015  Spain’s  IIP  was  positive  or
egative.  The  negative  sign  of  the  IIP  shows,  in  fact,  that  in
hose  years  Spain  was  no  net  purchaser  of  foreign  ﬁnancial
laims.  This  is  to  say,  that  during  the  period  2003--2015  Spain
as  beneﬁted  from  net  foreign  loans,  so  that  its  net  ﬁnancial
mports  are  not  part  of  the  cause  of  the  rise  in  its  external
ebt.  To  the  extent  that  net  foreign  loans  increase  the  coun-
ry’s  inﬂows  of  foreign  currencies,  the  variation  of  Spain’s
fﬁcial  reserves  already  account  for  them,  which  indicates
hat  the  increase  in  Spain’s  gross  external  debt  position  is
ustiﬁable  up  to  the  sum  of  its  CA  deﬁcit  and  the  increase  in
ts  ofﬁcial  reserves.
If  no  pathology  had  affected  the  payments  of  Spain’s
nternational  transactions,  the  following  equation  would
pply  for  the  period  2003--2015:
 in  external  debt  =  CA  deﬁcit  +    reserves
Now,  as  results  from  Table  1,  the  sum  of  Spain’s  current
ccount  deﬁcit,  761’9  billion  dollars,  and  of  the  increase
n  its  ofﬁcial  reserves,  13’7  billion  dollars,  from  2003  to
015  is  far  from  explaining  the  increase  in  its  gross  external
ebt  position,  1’264’5  billion  dollars.  On  the  contrary,  the
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ifference  between  the  latter  and  the  former  gives  the
mount  of  the  pathological  increase  in  Spain’s  external  debt.
ctual  increase  =  1’264’5  billion  dollars
ustiﬁable  increase =  775’6  billion  dollars
njustiﬁable  increase  =  1’264’5  −  775’6
=  488’9  billion  dollars
Statistical  data  are  subject  to  distortions  due  to  exchange
ate  ﬂuctuations.  Despite  cross  veriﬁcations,  increases  in
ontrol,  and  the  adoption  of  a  shared  methodology  and  pro-
ocol  by  international  institutions,  their  reliability  remains
pproximate.  Because  of  this,  one  cannot  provide  a  true
tatistical  proof  of  the  pathological  duplication  of  Spain’s
xternal  debt.  Yet,  the  correspondence  between  the  amount
f  the  unjustiﬁable  increase  in  Spain’s  external  debt,  488’9
illion  dollars,  and  that  of  its  CA  deﬁcit,  761’8  billion  dollars,
s  signiﬁcant.
Although  not  comparable  to  a  formal  proof,  the  conver-
ence  between  the  unjustiﬁable  increase  in  Spain’s  foreign
ebt  and  the  amount  of  its  net  imports  is  a  statistical  conﬁr-
ation  of  what  Schmitt  has  established  on  logical  basis.  It
onﬁrms,  indeed,  that,  in  the  present  non-system,  the  pay-
ent  of  Spain’s  net  global  imports  is  at  the  origin  of  its
overeign  debt,  an  external  debt  carried  by  the  country  as
 whole  whose  nature  is  entirely  pathological.
. Principles of a reform that would allow
pain to avoid incurring a sovereign debt
ithout impending its  external transactions
he  aim  of  a  reform  dealing  with  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  is
lear:  to  allow  Spain  to  pay  only  once  for  its  net  imports.  One
ust  ﬁnd  a  way  to  enable  Spain,  or  any  other  single  coun-
ry  willing  to  follow  its  example,  to  carry  out  its  external
ayments  on  its  own  without  incurring  a  sovereign  debt  in
he  presence  of  a  framework  characterized  by  a  non-system
f  international  payments.  In  other  words,  one  has  to  show
hat  any  single  country  can  implement  a  mechanism  capa-
le  of  protecting  it  against  the  pathologies  of  the  present
on-system  without  any  negative  side  effects  for  its  foreign
artners.  Spain  must  pay  its  foreign  economic  correspon-
ents  their  due,  and  it  must  do  so  without  any  need  to  reduce
ts  foreign  trade  in  the  least  because  of  the  reform.
In  his  2014  paper,  Schmitt  advocates  a  series  of  measures
hat,  if  implemented,  would  enable  any  net  importing  coun-
ry  not  only  to  avoid  getting  indebted,  but  also  to  earn  what
t  loses  today  in  the  double  payment  of  its  net  imports.  Let  us
ummarize  them  here  and  offer  a  concrete  example  showing
ow  they  would  work.
2
i
o
eA.  Cencini
.1.  The  creation  of  a  (sovereign)  Bureau
he  pathologies  affecting  the  non-system  of  international
ayments  are  of  a  macroeconomic  nature,  and  derive  from
he  lack  of  appreciation  of  this  crucial  aspect.  It  is  there-
ore  not  surprising  that  Schmitt’s  ﬁrst  measure  consists  in
reating  a  sovereign  Bureau  charged  to  represent  the  coun-
ry  as  a  whole.  The  aim  of  such  measure  is  to  transform
omestic  payments  to  the  beneﬁt  of  the  rest  of  the  world
nto  payments  carried  out  between  residents.  In  particular,
cting  on  behalf  of  the  country’s  residents,  the  commercial
anks  would  address  to  the  Spanish  Bureau  the  payments  in
omestic  currency  carried  out  to  cover  for  the  residents’
et  imports.  As  a  rule,  the  Bureau  would  collect  all  the
ayments  made  by  the  importers  and  see  to  the  payment
f  exporters.  It  follows  that  the  Bureau  would  obtain,  as  a
et  gain,  the  difference  between  the  sum  paid  by  Spanish
mporters  and  that  paid  to  Spanish  exporters  --  a  difference
qual  to  Spain’s  net  imports.  This  should  not  come  as  sur-
rise:  by  avoiding  the  double  payment  of  net  imports,  the
eform  would  prevent  the  loss  of  the  domestic  income  spent
y  Spanish  residents  in  the  domestic  payment  of  net  imports.
.2.  The  Bureau  would  have  to  lend  abroad  a  sum
f MR  equal  to  the  value  of  the  country’s  net
mports
his  second,  all-important  measure  is  difﬁcult  to  under-
tand.  Indeed,  Spain’s  Bureau  has  also  to  collect  all  the
ayments  made  by  the  rest  of  the  world  to  the  beneﬁt  of
pain,  and  to  pay  R’s  exporters,  in  MR,  for  their  sales  to
pain.  Even  after  the  reform,  this  would  require  Spain  (its
ureau)  to  borrow  abroad  a  sum  of  MR  equal  to  the  dif-
erence  between  Spain’s  purchases  and  sales.  However,  if
he  reform  envisaged  nothing  else,  no  major  change  would
ccur  with  respect  to  the  present  situation.  The  payment
f  net  imports  would  still  be  paid  by  Spain  through  a  for-
ign  loan,  and  the  duplication  discovered  by  Schmitt  (2012,
014)  could  not  be  avoided.  Under  these  conditions,  the  gain
f  the  Bureau  would  not  be  net  and  ﬁnal,  but  would  be  lost
o  Spain,  whose  Bureau  would  be  reduced  to  an  intermediary
ncapable  to  avoid  the  appropriation  by  R  of  part  of  Spain’s
omestic  income.
What  is  at  the  origin  of  the  pathology  that  gives  rise
o  countries’  sovereign  debt  is  the  payment  of  their  net
mports  through  foreign  loans. Hence,  what  the  reform  has
o  neutralize  is  the  loan  the  Spanish  Bureau  must  obtain  from
broad.  This  can  be  achieved  thanks  to  the  second  measure
nvisaged  by  the  reform,  that  is,  thanks  to  the  (counter)
oan  that  the  Bureau  would  grant  to  R.  Let  us  make  it  clear
t  once  that  the  two  loans  --  from  R  to  Spain  and  from  Spain
o  R  --  are  indeed  two  distinct  loans,  because  the  borrow-
rs  and  lenders  of  each  country  are  distinct  residents.  By
ending  to  R,  Spain  ‘obtains,  in  ﬁnancial  assets,  an  external
redit  of  1 dollar  [1  MR]  that  compensates  exactly  the  debt
f  1 dollar  [1  MR]  formed  by  the  foreign  borrowing  of  this
um.  The  result  is  the  full  success  of  the  reform’  (Schmitt,
014:  59).  Thanks  to  the  loan  granted  to  R  by  the  Span-
sh  Bureau,  the  rest  of  the  world  would  become  the  owner
f  part  of  Spain’s  current  output,  and  would  match  its  net
xports  by  equivalent  ﬁnancial  imports.  Indeed,  in  the  same
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way  as  Spain  acquires  the  ownership  over  part  of  R’s  current
production  because  of  the  loan  it  obtains  from  R,  the  rest
of  the  world  acquires  the  ownership  over  an  equivalent  part
of  Spain’s  current  output  because  of  the  loan  granted  to  R
by  the  Spanish  Bureau.
5.3.  The  Bureau  would  have  to  invest  into  a  new
production the  sum  of  domestic  income  it  earns
What  calls  for  this  measure  is  the  need  to  offset  the  decrease
in  employment  that  would  arise  if  the  Bureau  were  to  spend
or  redistribute  its  net  gain  for  the  purchase  of  Spain’s  domes-
tic  output.  The  explanation  is  given  by  the  fact  that  a
net  expenditure  of  foreign  currency  decreases  the  produc-
tion  of  the  national  economy  whose  foreign  imports  are
net.  ‘The  reason  is  that  the  value  of  4  dollars  [if  4  dol-
lars  are  the  amount  of  the  country’s  net  imports]  spent  to
cover  the  difference  between  expenditures  and  receipts  is
no  longer  available  for  the  selling  of  a  domestic  product’
(Schmitt,  2014:  98).  To  avoid  the  loss  of  domestic  income
suffered  by  Spain  because  of  the  duplication  of  the  pay-
ment  of  its  net  imports,  it  is  essential  to  create  a  Bureau
and  channel  through  it  all  the  payments  concerning  Spain’s
external  transactions.  Yet,  this  is  not  enough.  The  Bureau
has  to  invest  its  gain  in  domestic  income,  resulting  from  the
payment  of  Spain’s  net  imports  by  its  residents,  in  order
to  increase  Spain’s  domestic  production,  thus  avoiding  the
decrease  in  employment  due  to  the  payment  of  its  net
imports.
That  third  measure  would  beneﬁt  both  Spain  and  its  for-
eign  partners.  Indeed,  it  is  almost  redundant  to  note  that  it
is  in  the  interest  of  the  rest  of  the  world  to  trade  with  a  coun-
try  that  pays  for  all  its  net  purchases  and  whose  domestic
economy  does  not  suffer  from  a  rise  in  unemployment  every
time  it  pays  its  due.
A  related  argument  can  help  us  explain  the  reason  why
the  Spanish  Bureau  would  have  to  invest  its  net  gain  in  a new
production.  The  aim  of  the  reform  is  to  avoid  the  very  for-
mation  of  Spain’s  sovereign  debt,  while  making  sure  that  the
country  pays  its  foreign  creditors  their  due.  The  key  to  the
solution  is  to  conform  the  mechanism  of  international  pay-
ments  to  the  balance-of-payments  identity  between  EX  and
IM.  This  is  achieved  by  balancing  Spain’s  net  imports  with  the
ﬁnancial  transfer  of  an  equivalent  part  of  Spain’s  current
production.  Yet,  in  order  for  that  to  occur  without  redu-
cing  Spain’s  employment,  it  is  necessary  to  increase  Spain’s
production  through  the  investment  of  its  Bureau’s  net  gain.
If  Spain’s  Bureau  did  not  invest  its  net  gain  of  domestic
income  in  a  new  production,  Spain’s  domestic  product  would
decrease  as  an  effect  of  the  payment  of  its  net  imports.
Following  the  investment  of  the  Bureau,  Spain’s  production
would  remain  at  its  previous  level,  because  the  new  pro-
duction  would  compensate  the  decrease  due  to  the  loan
that  would  still  be  required  for  the  payment  of  Spain’s  net
imports,  and  the  rest  of  the  world  would  become  the  owner
of  a  part  of  Spain’s  output  equal  in  value  to  that  exported
to  Spain.A  country  alone  cannot  create  a  system  of  international
payments.  The  reform  suggested  by  Schmitt  allows  any  coun-
try  adopting  it  to  avoid  the  shortcomings  of  a  system  like
the  present  one,  but  not  the  need  for  the  deﬁcit  country  to9
orrow  abroad  the  difference  between  its  global  imports
nd  exports.  As  the  next  section  will  show,  even  though
pain’s  sovereign  debt  would  no  longer  build  up,  the  Bureau
ould  have  to  borrow  in  each  period  a  sum  equal  to  Spain’s
et  imports.  Thank  to  the  reform,  the  foreign  debt  ensu-
ng  from  these  ‘renewed’  loans  would  not  increase  period
fter  period,  because  of  the  reimbursement  that  takes  place
n  the  periods  following  the  ones  in  which  those  loans  are
llocated.  In  our  numerical  example,  if  Spain’s  net  imports
emain  equal  to  1  MR  for  an  indeﬁnite  number  of  periods,
pain’s  external  debt  would  merely  be  reproduced  in  each
eriod  and  remain  equal  to  1  MR.  Hence,  the  investment  of
he  Bureau’s  net  gain  in  an  additional  domestic  production  is
ecessary  to  avoid  a  decrease  in  the  level  of  Spain’s  domes-
ic  income  (i.e.  an  increase  in  unemployment)  --  a  state  of
ffairs  caused  by  the  amount  it  has  to  borrow  in  order  to
ake  up  the  difference  between  its  global  purchases  and
ales.
.  The advantages of the reform
s  already  mentioned,  the  main  advantage  would  be  to  avoid
he  loss  of  Spain’s  domestic  income  that  accompanies  the
ayment  of  its  net  imports.  Today,  Spain  recovers  the  domes-
ic  income  spent  by  its  residents  in  the  payment  of  their  net
oreign  purchases  only  through  a  macroeconomic  loan  that
eﬁnes  the  country’s  sovereign  debt.  Tomorrow,  the  Spanish
ureau  would  collect  the  net  sum  spent  by  Spain’s  residents
nd  invest  it  domestically.  At  the  same  time,  the  Bureau
ould  lend  to  R  an  amount  of  foreign  currencies  equal  to  the
ne  borrowed  from  R,  a  measure  that  would  make  the  forma-
ion  of  Spain’s  sovereign  debt  impossible  in  the  ﬁrst  place.
hat  is  extremely  important  to  observe  is  that  none  of
he  beneﬁts  that  Spain  would  obtain  from  Schmitt’s  reform
ould  damage  the  rest  of  the  world,  which,  on  the  contrary,
ould  obtain  the  full  payment  of  its  net  exports  and  beneﬁt
rom  the  advantage  of  having  a  reliable  country  as  a  for-
ign  economic  partner  instead  than  an  indebted  one.  Today,
 gives  up  part  of  its  current  production  in  exchange  for
n  equivalent  part  of  Spain’s  future  product,  and  faces  the
mpoverishment  its  trading  partner  suffers  from  any  time
ts  imports  exceed  its  exports.  Tomorrow,  Spain  would  fully
ay  R’s  net  exports  in  the  very  period  they  take  place,  and
oth  R  and  Spain  would  beneﬁt  from  the  very  likely  increase
n  trade  (commercial  and  ﬁnancial)  favoured  by  a  system
n  which  the  payment  of  net  imports  no  longer  entails  the
ormation  of  countries’  (Spain’s  in  our  case)  sovereign  debt.
As  the  reader  will  have  noticed,  the  reform  would  not
eneﬁt  Spain  two  times:  once  by  avoiding  the  loss  of  part
f  its  domestic  income  and  once  by  avoiding  the  forma-
ion  of  its  sovereign  debt.  Spain  would  indeed  beneﬁt  from
oth  these  advantages,  however  this  is  because  they  are  the
oined  effect  of  a  single  achievement:  the  reduction  of  the
ayments  of  Spain’s  net  imports  to  a  single  payment.  The
hoice  is  between  two  alternatives:  either
.  Spain  ﬁnances  its  net  imports  through  a  foreign  loan  (as  it
happens  today),  in  which  case  it  incurs  a  sovereign  debt
--  to  the  beneﬁt  of  the  ‘ﬁnancial  bubble’  --  because  of
the  loss  of  the  domestic  income  spent  by  its  residents  on
the  payment  of  their  net  imports;  or
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.  Spain  pays  only  once  its  net  purchases  by  exchanging  for-
eign  goods  against  the  ownership  over  part  of  its  current
production,  in  which  case  it  neither  suffers  from  a  loss
of  its  national  income,  nor  incurs  a  sovereign  debt.
Things  would  be  radically  different  if  the  reform  implied
he  non-payment  of  Spain’s  net  imports.  Yet,  this  is  not  at  all
he  case.  Indeed,  according  to  the  reform  advocated  here,
pain  would  pay  for  all  its  net  imports,  the  only  payment
bolished  being  the  second,  pathological  payment  suffered
y  Spain  to  the  beneﬁt  of  the  ﬁnancial  bubble.  Hence,  the
eform  would  not  harm  the  rest  of  the  world  in  the  least,
ecause  it  would  guarantee  the  full  payment  of  Spain’s  cred-
tors.
. An attempt at quantiﬁcation: the amount
f the gain that Spain would approximately
erive from the reform
tatistical  data  at  our  disposal  being  limited  and  approx-
mate,  the  use  of  the  conditional  tense  is  compulsory
ith  respect  to  the  gain  in  domestic  currency  that  Spain’s
overeign  Bureau  would  derive  from  the  implementation  of
chmitt’s  reform.  The  same  caution  is  called  for  as  far  as
pain’s  sovereign  debt  is  concerned.  However,  data  concern-
ng  Spain’s  external  debt  are  largely  available  (see  Table  1),
nd  it  is  safe  to  claim  that  the  amount  of  unjustiﬁed  increase
n  Spain’s  external  debt  from  2003  to  2015  (489  billion  dol-
ars)  gives  a  hint  of  the  debt  that  Spain  would  have  avoided
uring  that  period.  Moreover,  by  assuming  that  the  average
nterest  rate  during  the  13  years  considered  in  Table  1  was
round  3%,  it  is  possible  to  quantify  the  gains  that  Spain
ould  have  obtained  by  not  having  to  service  its  sovereign
ebt:
%  489  =  14’7  billion  dollars
The  ﬁgure  advanced  here  does  not  provide  more  than  an
pproximation  of  what  Spain  would  have  saved  in  interest
ayments  if  it  had  been  able  to  avoid  the  formation  of  its
overeign  debt  in  the  period  2003--2015.
As  for  the  gain  in  domestic  income,  in  order  to  calculate
ts  amount  we  would  have  to  know:
a.  The  sum  of  Spain’s  net  (commercial  and  ﬁnancial)
imports  during  a  given  period  of  time,  and
.  The  sum  of  Spain’s  reimbursement  of  the  foreign  debts
incurred  both  previously  and  during  the  considered
period.
It  is  clear,  indeed,  that  both  these  sums  together  deter-
ine  the  amount  of  Spain’s  net  expenditures.  Since  the
et  foreign  expenditures  of  Spain’s  residents  measure  the
ain  of  Spain’s  Bureau  in  domestic  currency,  it  is  necessary
o  add  a.  and  b.  in  order  to  quantify  that  gain.  Unfortu-
ately,  data  concerning  Spain’s  principal  repayments  are
ot  ofﬁcially  available,  and  one  can  only  guess  what  their
mount  could  be  if  a  series  of  conditions  were  to  apply.  Let
s  examine  a  hypothetical,  plausible  example  by  assuming
hat,  in  the  period  2003--2015,  Spain’s  external  debt  was
i
i
i
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epaid  after  a  time  interval  of  6  years.  Taking  into  consider-
tion  the  fact  that  statistical  data  concerning  Spain’s  gross
xternal  debt  position  before  2002  are  not  available,  one
an  calculate  the  amount  that  Spain  would  have  paid  back
principal  repayments)  under  this  assumption  from  2008  to
015.  Given  the  statistical  data  ofﬁcially  published,  and  con-
idering  the  6  years  interval  we  have  assumed,  in  2015  the
mount  of  Spain’s  principal  repayment  of  its  sovereign  debt
ould  have  been  138  billion  dollars  (where  138  billion  dol-
ars  is  the  amount  of  the  unjustiﬁed  or  pathological  increase
n  Spain’s  gross  external  debt  in  2009).  This  is  nothing  more
han  the  theoretical  amount  of  its  external  debt  that  Spain
ould  have  paid  back  assuming  that  principal  repayments
ere  carried  out  in  full  6  years  after  debt  arose.  More  accu-
ate  calculations  are  required  and  experts  of  the  Banco  de
spãna  should  be  able  to  provide  the  actual  data  of  Spain’s
rincipal  repayments  necessary  to  carry  them  out.
As  long  as  the  reform  applies  in  a  situation  where  Spain
ould  still  have  to  reimburse  its  previous  sovereign  debts,
he  gain  of  the  Spanish  Bureau  would  be  equal  to  the  sum
f  its  current  net  imports  and  of  its  principal  repayments.
s  in  2015  Spain’s  current  account  balance  was  positive  by
6  billion  dollars,  the  gain  of  the  Bureau  would  have  been
pproximately  of
38  billion  dollars  −  16  billion  dollars  =  122  billion  dollars
Our  statistical  exercise  merely  aims  to  hint  at  the  sums
nvolved,  in  particular,  of  the  signiﬁcant  amount  the  Span-
sh  Bureau  would  derive  from  the  implementation  of  the
eform  proposed  by  Schmitt  (2014,  2017)  and  advocated
ere.  Experts  in  analysing  Spain’s  statistical  data  should  be
ble  to  approximate  the  right  ﬁgures  to  the  best  of  their
nowledge.  In  the  meantime,  the  indicative  amount  calcu-
ated  here  is  enough  to  give  a  rough  idea  of  the  potential
eneﬁts  for  Spain’s  Bureau.
It  is  easy  to  imagine  the  positive  impact  on  Spanish  unem-
loyment  if  this  amount  of  money  had  been  invested  by
pain’s  Bureau  in  the  production  of  additional  goods  and
ervices.  Spain’s  domestic  production  would  have  increased
ccordingly,  and  the  country  would  have  paid  its  net  global
urchases  by  transferring  to  the  rest  of  the  world  the  own-
rship  of  a  part  of  its  domestic  economy’s  output  for  the
ame  value.  Spain  as  a  country  would  have  been  spared  an
xternal  debt  additional  to  the  one  incurred  by  its  residents,
nd  its  sovereign  debt  would  not  have  increased  one  iota.
. A brief account of the practical way Spain
ould carry out the payment of its net imports
fter the implementation of the reform
ne  can  provide  the  clearest  presentation  of  all  the  pay-
ents  involving  Spain’s  Bureau  by  distinguishing  between
eriods  and  assuming  that  the  Bureau  reimburses  the  exter-
al  debt  incurred  in  each  period  in  the  following  one.  Since
he  Spanish  Bureau  would  be  in  charge  of  carrying  out  all
he  payments  relating  to  Spain’s  international  transactions,
t  is  clear  that  the  Bureau  would  represent  the  country
tself  and  would  be  in  very  close  contact  with  the  Span-
sh  central  bank.  Indeed,  nothing  prevents  the  Bureau  from
eing  a  special  branch  of  the  central  bank.  Moreover,  Spain’s
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Table  2  January’s  transactions  and  their  result.
(1)  Importers
11  MS−→Spain’s  Bureau10  MS−→Exporters
Net  gain  of  the  Bureau=1  MS  (=1  MR)
(2)  Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves
1  MR−→Bureau 1  MR−→R
Increase  in  Spain’sexternal  debt=decrease  in  its  ofﬁcial  reserves=1  MR
Table  3  February’s  payments.
(1)  Importers
11  MS−→Spain’s  Bureau10  MS−→Exporters
Net  gain  of  the  Bureau=1  MS(=1  MR)
(2)  R
1  MR−→
loan
Bureau
1  MR−→
reimbursement
Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves
(3) R
1  MR−→
loan
Bureau
1  MR−→
loan
R
1  MR 1  MR
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1  MR−→
loan
Bureau
1  MR−→
loan
R
ofﬁcial  reserves  deﬁning  the  ﬁnancial  assets  of  the  country
as  a  whole,  as  set  of  its  residents,  an  integration  of  ofﬁcial
reserves  into  Spain’s  Bureau  or  the  possibility  for  the  Bureau
to  use  part  of  Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves  as  a  revolving  fund  is
easily  conceivable.  Let  us  suppose  once  again  that  Spain’s
net  imports,  commercial  and  ﬁnancial,  are  equal  to  1  MR  in
each  period.  If  we  assumed  that  periods  are  months,  and  if
the  reform  were  implemented  at  the  beginning  of  the  year,
Spain’s  Bureau  would  have  to  borrow  1  MR  in  January  in  order
to  pay  for  Spain’s  net  imports.  Rather  than  borrowing  this
sum  from  R,  it  is  simpler  to  assume  that  it  would  borrow
it  from  Spain’s  ofﬁcial  or  international  reserves.  Assuming
that  1  MR  =  1  MS  (Spain’s  domestic  money),  the  result  of  the
payments  ﬂowing  in  and  out  of  the  Spanish  Bureau  at  the
end  of  January  is  described  in  Table  2.
Even  though  the  reform  would  not  yet  fully  operate  in
January,  the  situation  would  be  remarkably  better  than
the  one  we  have  today.  Indeed,  the  net  gain  of  the  Span-
ish  Bureau,  1  MR  in  Spain’s  domestic  currency  (1),  would
be  entirely  new,  and  would  compensate  for  the  increase
in  Spain’s  external  debt  due  to  the  decrease  in  its  ofﬁcial
reserves  (2)  (since  foreign  reserve  assets  deﬁne  a  credit,
it  is  clear  that  their  decrease  is  tantamount  to  an  increase
in  debt).  The  transaction  represented  in  (3)  is  one  of  the
key  operations  in  Schmitt’s  reform.  It  would  allow  for  the
payment  of  Spain’s  net  imports  by  transferring  to  R  the  own-
ership  over  part  of  Spain’s  current  production.  If  it  is  true
that,  by  lending  part  of  its  current  domestic  income  to  Spain,
the  rest  of  the  world  is  paying  for  Spain’s  net  imports,  it  is
equally  true  that  the  loan  granted  by  Spain  to  R  would  pay
for  an  equivalent  amount  of  R’s  imports.  ‘[T]he  credit  of  1
dollar  granted  by  the  Bureau  to  non-residents  consists,  for  R,
in  the  external  payment  of  an  equal  part  of  its  own  imports,
exactly  ‘‘symmetrical’’  to  the  imports  of  A  [Spain]  paid  by
the  rest  of  the  world’  (Schmitt,  2014:  61).
It  is  from  February  onward  that  the  reform  would  work  in
full,  because  from  then  on  the  Bureau  would  pay  back  the
loan  obtained  in  the  preceding  period  and  would  keep  on
lending  an  amount  of  foreign  currency  to  R.  The  various  pay-
ments  involving  the  Spanish  Bureau  are  those  represented  in
Table  3.
(1)  shows  the  net  gain  of  the  Spanish  Bureau  due  to
the  difference  between  the  amount  paid  by  Spain’s
importers,  in  domestic  income,  and  the  one  paid  to
Spain’s  exporters,  also  in  MS.
(2)  represents  the  reconstitution  of  Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves
thanks  to  a  loan  obtained  from  R.  Indebted  to  Spain’s
ofﬁcial  reserves  because  of  the  loan  obtained  in  Jan-
uary,  the  Spanish  Bureau  would  cancel  its  previous  debt,
but  it  would  also  incur  a  new  debt  to  R.  Yet,  the
i
c
t(4) Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves−→Bureau−→R
situation  for  Spain,  considered  as  a  whole,  would  not
deﬁne  an  increase  in  its  external  debt:  the  increase
in  credit  of  Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves  would  balance  the
Bureau’s  indebtedness.  What  Spain’s  ofﬁcial  reserves
lend  on  the  foreign  exchange  market  would  balance
what  R  lends  to  the  Spanish  Bureau.
Transaction  (3)  would  guarantee  the  compliance  with  the
alance-of-payments  identity  without  depending  on  Spain’s
uture  production,  as  is  the  case  today.  By  balancing  the
xternal  loan  obtained  by  Spain  from  R  with  an  equivalent
oan  granted  by  Spain  to  R,  the  implementation  of  (3)  would
ufﬁce  to  avoid  the  very  formation  of  Spain’s  sovereign  debt.
ndeed,  from  the  reciprocal  lending  of  Spain  and  the  rest  of
he  world  ‘we  derive  that  R  owes  A  [Spain]  exactly  what
 [Spain]  owes  R.  As  a  consequence,  if  country  R  does  not
et  indebted  to  country  A  [Spain],  it  is  logical  and  perfectly
orrect  and  just  that  country  A  [Spain]  does  not  get  indebted
o  country  R’  (Schmitt,  2014:  61).
The  last  transaction,  (4),  is  required  to  enable  Spain’s
ureau  to  pay  for  its  country’s  net  imports  of  February.
espite  the  balance-of-payments  identity,  it  remains  true,
n  fact,  that  Spain’s  total  imports,  commercial  and  ﬁnan-
ial,  in  February  amount  to  11  MR,  while  its  total  exports
re  merely  equal  to  10  MR.
At  the  end  of  February,  the  situation  would  be  as  follows.
)  Spain’s  Bureau  has  a  net  gain  of  1  MS
)  No  sovereign  debt  forms  for  Spain
c)  The  rest  of  the  world  is  fully  paid  for  its  net  exports
)  Spain’s  external  debt,  measured  by  the  decrease  in  its
ofﬁcial  reserves,  is  again  equal  to  1  MR
If  Spain’s  foreign  transactions  were  to  remain  unchanged
ver  a number  of  periods  (months),  its  external  debt  would
erely  be  reproduced:  in  the  nth  period,  it  would  still  be
qual  to  1  MR.  The  result  of  the  reform  would  be  to  enable
pain  to  pay  for  the  totality  of  its  net  imports,  without  get-
ing  indebted  and  without  suffering  from  a  loss  of  domestic
ncome.  A  mechanism  that  guarantees  the  full  compensation
f  Spain’s  net  imports  by  an  equivalent  ﬁnancial  transfer
f  its  current  output  would  achieve  this.  Moreover,  in  each
eriod  Spain’s  external  debt  of  1 MR  would  have  no  effect  on
pain’s  domestic  economy,  because  the  decrease  in  national
ncome  (increase  in  unemployment)  it  would  entail  would  be
ounter-balanced  by  the  increase  due  to  the  investment  of
he  Bureau’s  net  gain  in  a  new,  domestic  production.
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. Conclusion
et  me  conclude  by  comparing  the  present,  pathological
ituation  with  the  one  that  would  result  from  the  imple-
entation  of  the  reform  advocated  here.
In  today’s  non-system  of  international  payments,  net
xternal  purchases  are  settled  in  real  terms  and,  addition-
lly, in  monetary  terms.  Because  of  the  lack  of  a  true
ystem,  the  monetary  payment  of  Spain’s  net  imports  is
dded  to  the  real  payment.  This  is  so  because  Spain’s  net
mports  are  ﬁnanced  through  a  foreign  loan,  which  implies
hat  Spain  balances  its  net  purchases  of  R’s  current  output
hrough  a  sale  of  an  equivalent  part  of  its  future  production.
ven  though  it  has  already  fully  paid,  in  real  terms,  for  its
et  imports,  Spain  has  still  to  carry  out  a  monetary  payment
o  the  beneﬁt  of  R’s  exporters.
The  reform  would  change  things  radically.  Charged  to
ollect  the  payments  of  Spain’s  importers  and  to  pay  domes-
ic  exporters,  the  Spanish  Bureau  would  prevent  the  loss  of
ational  income  occurring  today.  At  the  same  time,  by  lend-
ng  to  R  the  same  amount  it  borrows  from  the  rest  of  the
orld  (but  not  from  the  same  agents),  Spain’s  Bureau  would
uarantee  the  payment  of  R’s  net  exports  in  terms  of  Spain’s
urrent  production  and  avoid  the  formation  of  a  sovereign
ebt.
In  the  present  non-system,  Spain  gives  up  part  of  its
uture  output  and,  on  top  of  it,  has  to  incur  an  external  debt
n  order  to  pay,  monetarily,  for  its  net  imports.  The  reform
ould  enable  Spain  to  give  up  part  of  its  current  output  and
hus  avoid  ﬁnancing  the  payment  of  its  net  imports  through
 net  foreign  loan.  Today,  Spain  must  purchase  the  ‘vehic-
lar’  money  (MR)  necessary  to  convey  the  real  payment  of
ts  net  purchases.  Tomorrow,  the  reform  would  avoid  the
onﬂation  of  the  monetary  with  the  real  payment  through  a
oan  granted  by  the  Spanish  Bureau  to  the  rest  of  the  world.
Two  great  advantages  would  derive  from  the  reform.
.  The  formation  of  a  net  gain,  in  domestic  income,  to  the
beneﬁt  of  Spain’s  sovereign  Bureau
.  The  non-formation  of  Spain’s  sovereign  debt
Are  these  one  too  many?  Is  it  not  enough  to  give  Spain
he  possibility  to  avoid  getting  indebted?  Why  should  Spain’s
ureau  beneﬁt  from  a  net  gain  on  top  of  it?  Put  the  other
ay  around:  would  it  not  be  correct  to  say  that,  if  the  Span-
sh  Bureau  is  the  legitimate  beneﬁciary  of  the  net  payment
arried  out  by  Spanish  residents,  it  has  also  to  carry  the  load
f  the  payment  of  R  in  MR,  and  thus  incur  an  external  debt?
he  answer  to  all  these  questions  is  that  both  advantages  are
erfectly  justiﬁed,  and  that  none  of  them  is  to  the  detriment
f  R.  Because  of  the  loan  granted  by  the  Bureau  to  R,  Spain
ould  pay  the  rest  of  the  world  in  full,  and  it  would  there-
ore  be  correct  and  just  for  Spain  not  to  incur  a  sovereign
ebt.  At  the  same  time,  precisely  because  it  would  have
ully  paid  its  net  imports,  it  would  be  absurd  if  Spain  were
o  lose  the  domestic  income  spent  by  its  residents  in  the
ayment  of  their  net  imports.  If  this  were  to  happen,  Spain
ould  have  to  borrow  abroad  in  order  to  restore  the  previ-
us  level  of  its  domestic  income,  and  would  thus  incur  the
ery  external  debt  the  reform  is  supposed  to  avoid.  The  gain
f  Spain’s  Bureau  is  the  consequence  of  the  fact  that  Spain
IA.  Cencini
ould  no  longer  lose  part  of  its  national  income,  necessary
or  avoiding  the  increase  in  unemployment  that,  otherwise,
ould  inevitably  accompany  it.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  the
eform  requires  the  productive  investment  of  this  gain,  pre-
isely  to  avoid  a  decrease  in  employment,  is  a clear  sign  that
he  Bureau’s  net  gain  is  perfectly  justiﬁed.
To  summarize:  the  aim  of  the  reform  is  to  reduce  to  one
he  payment  of  Spain’s  net  imports.  The  fulﬁlment  of  this
im  requires  the  reduction  to  zero  of  the  loss  of  Spain’s
ational  income.  It  is  through  a  loan  granted  to  R  by  the
panish  Bureau  that  Spain’s  net  imports  would  be  paid,  thus
aking  both  the  reduction  in  Spain’s  domestic  employment,
nd  the  increase  in  its  external  debt  totally  unjustiﬁed.
Countries’  sovereign  debts  are  entirely  pathological  and,
hus,  groundless,  and  so  is  the  loss  of  domestic  income
hat  makes  them  unavoidable  in  the  present  non-system  of
nternational  payments.  The  passage  from  disorder  to  order
llowed  by  the  reform  would  make  it  possible  for  Spain
o  pay  its  net  imports  to  the  full  satisfaction  of  its  cred-
tors  and,  by  the  same  token,  to  avoid  getting  indebted
nd  reducing  its  level  of  employment.  This  would  not  only
e  true  for  the  payment  of  Spain’s  current  net  imports,
ut  also  for  its  principal  repayments.  The  reimbursement
f  the  external  debt  previously  incurred  by  Spain  increases
ts  net  expenditures  and,  according  to  the  reform,  would
ncrease  its  Bureau’s  net  gain.  Hence,  principal  repayments
ould  no  longer  have  a negative  impact  on  Spain’s  econ-
my,  whose  level  of  production  (employment)  would  not
ecrease,  thanks  to  the  investment  of  the  net  gain  of  Spain’s
ureau.  The  approximate  amount  of  this  gain  for  the  period
003--2014  gives  a  ﬂavour  of  the  substantial  impact  that
he  reform  would  have  had  on  Spain’s  domestic  economy.
he  pathological  formation  of  countries’  sovereign  debts  has
ontributed  to  the  growth  of  unemployment  as  well  as  to
hat  of  the  ﬁnancial  bubble  and  the  ensuing  ﬁnancial  cri-
is.  Schmitt’s  analysis  opens  a  way  out  of  this  increasingly
orrying  situation.  Let  us  hope  that  the  governments  of  net
mporting  countries  (Spain?)  will  soon  follow  it  to  the  great
eneﬁt  of  their  population.
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